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Abstract
Recent European Court of Justice (ECJ) case law has highlighted apparent inconsisten-
cies in ECJ rulings on the regulation of voluntary additional health insurance. In 2013, 
the ECJ upheld Belgian regulations limiting the operation of the free market by re-
stricting increases in premium rates of additional health insurance contracts. By con-
trast, in 2012, an ECJ ruling required Slovenia to repeal such restrictive legislation and 
not to hinder the operation of the free market. The objective of this article is to feed 
the discussion on the question whether and under what conditions free-market-driven 
additional health insurance in the European Union might be acceptable. We conclude 
that, provided that basic health insurance effectively covers all essential healthcare 
(essential healthcare services being broadly defined), additional health insurance 
could be regulated in the same way as all other non-life insurance.
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1 Introduction
In the European Union (EU), voluntary additional health insurance is, in 
principle, subject to free market rules and competition. As an exception, gov-
ernments may impose rules restricting free competition when private health 
insurance serves as a partial or complete alternative to health cover provided 
by the statutory social security system (‘substitutive health insurance’). In this 
article, we will focus on ‘voluntary additional health insurance’, which we de-
fine as ‘all voluntary individual (not: group) additional private health insurance 
other than substitutive health insurance’ (e.g., complementary or supplemen-
tary health insurance).
In 2013, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled that the European insur-
ance directives do not preclude the Belgian government from adopting regula-
tions limiting competition in the additional health insurance market in order 
to protect consumers against sharp and unexpected increases in premium 
rates.1 The ECJ did not concur with the opinion of the European Commission, 
which considered that the Belgian legislation at issue was contrary to the 
principle of freedom to set rates. As will be discussed below, this judgment 
differs from a 2012 ruling where the ECJ required Slovenia to repeal its restrictive 
legislation on increases in premium rates.2
In this article, we will analyse the impact of these two ECJ rulings on the 
application of free-market principles on voluntary additional health insur-
ance markets in the EU. We will discuss the arguments made in favour and 
against restrictive price regulation. In addition to an analysis of the Belgian 
and Slovenian cases, we will also refer to the concept of services of general 
economic interest and to the ECJ ruling in the BUPA case3 (Ireland). Starting 
from the Belgian and Slovenian ECJ cases on price regulation in the additional 
health insurance market, we will broaden the discussion to the question of the 
extent to which free market rules effectively apply to additional health insur-
ance in the EU. The objective of this article is to feed the discussion on the 
question whether and under what conditions free-market-driven additional 
health insurance in the EU might be acceptable.
1   Case C-577/11, DKV Belgium SA v. Association belge des consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:146.
2   Case C-185/11, Commission v. Slovenia ECLI:EU:C:2012:43.
3   Case T-289/03, BUPA and others v. Commission [2008] ECR II-81.
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2 Additional Private Health Insurance and EU Regulation
In addition to the general treaty provisions on freedom of establishment 
(Article 49 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’)4) 
and freedom to provide services (Article 56 TFEU), the EU has adopted spe-
cific non-life insurance directives with the aim of increasing competition in 
the European insurance market.5 Recital 19 of the Third Non-Life Insurance 
Directive6 states that ‘within the framework of an internal market it is in the 
policyholder’s interest that he should have access to the widest possible range 
of insurance products available in the Community so that he can choose that 
which is best suited to his needs’.
When it comes to insurers’ freedom to set premium rates, Article 8(3) of 
the First Non-Life Insurance Directive7 and Articles 29 and 39(2) and (3) 
of the Third Non-Life Insurance Directive provide: ‘[. . .] Member States may 
not retain or introduce prior notification or approval of proposed increases in 
premium rates except as part of general price-control systems’.
Article 54 of the Third Non-Life Insurance Directive provides an exception 
to this rule. A Member State’s supervisory authority may impose specific mea-
sures in the form of restrictions on insurance contracts in the interest of the 
‘general good’, where contracts covering health risks ‘may serve as a partial or 
complete alternative to health cover provided by the statutory social security 
system’. Where this is the case, a Member State can require private insurers to 
‘comply with the specific legal provisions adopted by that Member State to pro-
tect the general good in that class of insurance’.8 A number of legal provisions 
may be introduced if private cover provides a partial or complete alternative 
to statutory cover: open enrolment, community rating, lifetime cover, policies 
4   Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 202, 
7 June 2016, pp. 47-200.
5   For an analysis of the relevant EU legal framework, see F. Paolucci, A. Den Exter and W.P.M.M. 
van de Ven, ‘Solidarity in competitive health insurance markets: analysing the relevant EC 
legal framework’, Health Economics, Policy and Law 1(2) (2006) 107-126.
6   Council Directive 92/49/EEC of 18 June 1992 on the coordination of laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions relating to direct insurance other than life assurance and amend-
ing Directives 73/239/EEC and 88/357/EEC, OJ L 228, 11 August 1992, pp. 1-23 (‘Third Non-Life 
Insurance Directive’).
7   Council Directive 73/239/EEC of 24 July 1973 on the coordination of laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions relating to the taking-up and pursuit of the business of direct in-
surance other than life assurance, OJ L 228, 16 August 1973, pp. 3-19 (First Non-Life Insurance 
Directive).
8   Article 54(1) and Recital 24 of the Third Non-Life Insurance Directive.
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standardised in line with the cover provided by the statutory health insurance 
scheme at a premium rate at or below a prescribed maximum, participation 
in risk equalisation schemes (referred to as ‘loss compensation schemes’) and 
the operation of private health insurance on a technical basis similar to life 
insurance.9 Measures taken to protect the general good must be shown to be 
necessary and proportional to this aim; not unduly restrict the right of estab-
lishment or the freedom to provide services; and apply in an identical manner 
to all insurers operating within a member state.
In his letter of 25 November 2008, European Commissioner Bolkestein, re-
sponding to a question from the Dutch government on the application of EU 
regulation to private health insurance, suggested that the Article 54 exception 
only applies to substitutive health insurance: ‘I do not think that it would be 
proportionate to apply the requirements to any complementary insurance 
cover offered by private insurers which goes beyond the basic social security 
package of cover laid down by the legislation’.10 Thomson and Mossialos dis-
agree with the assumption that only substitutive private health insurance pro-
vides social protection. They argue that where the statutory benefits package 
is relatively narrow and/or subject to extensive co-payments, it could be con-
sidered that individuals do not have adequate protection from the financial 
risk associated with ill health unless they purchase additional health insur-
ance covering excluded (and effective) services and/or statutory user charges.11 
However, the credibility of this argument depends on the extent to which low-
income groups and high-risk groups (e.g., the elderly and chronically ill) effec-
tively have access to such additional cover. Regulation of voluntary additional 
health insurance that is not affordable for these groups cannot be considered 
to effectively protect the general good.
Under certain conditions, national governments can restrict the applica-
tion of free market principles to private health insurance. A restriction on 
free competition may be justified where it serves overriding requirements 
relating to the public interest, is suitable for securing the attainment of the 
objective which it pursues and does not go beyond what is necessary in order 
to attain it.12
9    Ibid. Article 54(2) and Recital 24.
10   F. Bolkestein, ‘Letter from the European Commission to the Dutch Minister of Health, 
Welfare and Sport’, European Commission, 25 November 2003.
11   S. Thomson and E. Mossialos, ‘Private health insurance and the internal market’, in: 
E. Mossialos, G. Permanand, R. Baeten and T. Hervey (eds.), Health Systems Governance 
in Europe: The Role of EU Law and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 
pp. 419-460.
12   Case C-518/06, Commission v. Italy [2009] ECR I-3491, para. 72.
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3  EU Case Law on Price Regulation of Additional Health Insurance
In recent years, the ECJ has taken different views in two cases (Commission 
v. Slovenia (2012) and DKV Belgium SA v. Association belge des consommateurs 
Test-Achats ASBL (2013))13 on the question whether government intervention 
in setting the prices of additional health insurance contracts is consistent with 
EU regulation. On the one hand, in its ruling of 26 January 2012 in Commission 
v. Slovenia, the Court concluded that Slovenia’s rules on complementary health 
insurance did not comply with the EU non-life insurance Directives. The Court 
found that a number of provisions in the Slovenian Health Care and Health 
Insurance Act (‘Zakon o zdravstvenem varstvu in zdravstvenem zavarovanju’ 
(‘ZZVZZ’)) did not comply with some of the basic freedoms outlined in the 
EU’s non-life insurance Directives. By contrast, by its ruling of 7 March 2013 in 
DKV Belgium SA, the Court upheld the system of restrictive price regulation of 
existing private health insurance contracts in Belgium. The Court accepted a 
requirement of prior notification and approval of proposed increases in pre-
mium rates in the Belgian context but not in the Slovenian context.
These two cases, which each concern price regulation, illustrate the need for 
discussion on the appropriate balance between regulation and the operation 
of the free market in the additional health insurance sector more broadly. This 
important issue of health policy will be discussed in more depth in section 5. 
Before that, in section 4, we will bring into the discussion two legal elements 
that are relevant to consideration of the appropriate balance to be drawn, the 
concept of services of general economic interest and the proportionality of 
national regulation aiming at restricting free market.
3.1 Slovenia
3.1.1 Health Insurance System
In 2015, health expenditure per capita in Slovenia — expressed in purchasing 
power parity — was less than the EU28 average but above the average for the 
ten countries that joined the EU in May 2004.14 Private health expenditure, 
comprising voluntary additional health insurance and out-of-pocket expendi-
ture, is close to 30 per cent of total health expenditure.15 All Slovenians are 
covered by compulsory basic health insurance, which is part of a Bismarckian 
13   Supra notes 1 and 2.
14   OECD/EU, Health at a Glance: Europe 2016 — State of Health in the EU Cycle (Paris: OECD 
Publishing, 2016), online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264265592-enR, accessed 24 
January 2017,
15   In 2015, Slovenia’s public spending as share of total health expenditure was 72.2 per 
cent. Private health expenditure amounted to 27.8 per cent of total health expenditure. 
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system of social security. Voluntary additional health insurance is quite im-
portant in Slovenia, covering about half of private expenditure.16 Voluntary 
additional health insurance was introduced in 1993 to cover co-payments for 
compulsory health insurance.17 Co-payments apply for visits to general prac-
titioners, specialists and hospitals as well as for pharmaceuticals and vary 
from 5 per cent to 75 per cent. Almost all Slovenians have taken out addi-
tional health insurance to cover co-payments.18 Additional health insurance 
is provided by Vzajemna, a non-profit public insurance company, along with 
Adriatic-Slovenica, Triglav and Merkur, three for-profit insurance companies.19 
Vzajemna and Adriatic-Slovenica have been active since 1993. In the period 
2004-2005, two new commercial companies — Triglav and Merkur — entered 
into the Slovene market. They launched an overt cream-skimming campaign 
aimed at younger and healthier insured individuals by offering risk-related 
premiums. In 2005, a risk-equalisation scheme was adopted. In order to pre-
vent cream-skimming, additional health insurance companies were obliged 
to participate in the risk-equalisation scheme to level out differences among 
insurance companies in terms of the costs of healthcare. Insurance companies 
had to apply a unified flat premium for all insured people, irrespective of sex, 
age or health status.20
3.1.2 Commission v. Slovenia21
According to the Slovenian Health Care and Health Insurance Act (ZZVZZ), 
increases in premium rates of additional health insurance contracts had to be 
Source: OECD Health Statistics 2016, figures for 2015, online at http://stats.oecd.org/index 
.aspx?DataSetCode=HEALTH_STAT, accessed 22 January 2017.
16   Ibid., 14.8 per cent.
17   Reimbursement of co-payments amounted to EUR 404 million in 2014, representing 
85 per cent of total expenditure by additional health insurance (EUR 474 million). The 
remaining EUR 70 million was spent on care not reimbursed by Slovenian social security. 
S. Thomas, S. Thomson and T. Evetovits, ‘Making sense of complementary health insur-
ance’, final report, Slovenian Ministry of Public Health, 2015, online at http://www.mz.gov 
.si/fileadmin/mz.gov.si/pageuploads/Analiza/21012016/21012016Report_Making_sense_
of_CHI_-_Slovenia.pdf, accessed 26 January 2017.
18   Children under 18 years and students under 26 years are excluded from co-payments. 
Approximately 98 per cent of all individuals who are eligible to pay co-payments have 
taken out additional health insurance. T. Albreht, E. Turk, M. Toth, J. Ceglar, S. Marn, 
R. Pribaković Brinovec, M. Schäfer, O. Avdeeva and E. van Ginneken, ‘Slovenia: Health 
system review’, Health Systems in Transition 11(3) (2009) 1-168.
19   Ibid.
20   Ibid.
21   Supra note 2.
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notified to and approved by the relevant national supervisory authority.22 On 23 
March 2007, the European Commission sent a letter of formal notice to Slovenia 
stating that certain articles of the ZZVZZ breached the non-life insurance 
Directives and Articles 56 and 63 TFEU.23 Article 63 TFEU was invoked because 
the ZZVZZ obliged insurance companies to reinvest at least half of the profits 
from additional health insurance in the administration of this insurance.24 In 
response, Slovenia argued that, although additional health insurance was not 
compulsory, it was part of the Slovenian social security system since it rep-
resented a matter of public interest.25 In defence of the existing regulation, 
Slovenia referred to Article 54 of the Third Non-Life Insurance Directive.26 
Later, in a letter of 26 August 2009, Slovenia proposed to remove the contested 
articles from the ZZVZZ. As Slovenia did not ultimately amend the ZZVZZ, the 
European Commission referred the case to the ECJ. On 26 January 2012, 
the ECJ ruled that certain requirements of the ZZVZZ were in breach of Article 
8(3) of the First Non-Life Insurance Directive and Articles 29 and 39 of the 
Third Non-Life Insurance Directive, more particularly the requirement of prior 
notification and approval of proposed increases in premium rates, the require-
ment of prior agreement of the Minister of Public Health before setting up an 
additional health insurance business in Slovenia (including notification of all 
terms and conditions) and the requirement of prior notification and approval 
of proposed changes of terms and conditions.
The European Commission also argued that Article 62, §2, 4° ZZVZZ (re-
quirement that half of the profit resulting from additional health insurance 
be invested in its administration) and Article 62f, §9 ZZVZZ (requirement that 
insurance companies from other Member States appoint a domiciliary agent 
in Slovenia) did not comply with Articles 56 and 63 TFEU. However, since the 
Commission’s claim on these points was not correctly formulated, the Court 
dismissed it.
Subsequently, the Slovenian government adapted the ZZVZZ by removing 
the contested provisions. The amendments included repeal of Articles 62, §2, 
4° and 62f, §9 ZZVZZ, even though the ECJ had not ruled on their compatibility 
with EU law.
22   Article 62, § 2, 6° ZZVZZ.
23   Supra note 2, paras. 10 and 12.
24   Article 62, § 2, 4° ZZVZZ.
25   Supra note 2, para. 11. For a discussion on the public interest argument see infra section 
4.2.
26   Ibid. For further explanation of Article 54, see supra section 2.
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3.2  Belgium
3.2.1  Health Insurance System
Belgium has a system of compulsory health insurance with a very broad ben-
efits package. Health insurance is part of a Bismarckian social security system. 
Compulsory health insurance is administered by seven sickness funds. Every 
citizen is obliged to be a member of a sickness fund.
In 2015, Belgium had the 8th highest healthcare expenditure per capita 
measured in purchasing power parity among the EU28 countries.27 Private 
expenditure (i.e., out-of-pocket expenditure plus additional health insurance) 
represents more than 20 per cent of total health expenditure.28
Additional health insurance covers less than 5 per cent of total expendi-
ture on health.29 Half of this 5 per cent consists of services and benefits pro-
vided by the sickness funds to their members and for which the sickness funds 
request a membership fee. These services and benefits are very diverse, e.g., 
reimbursement of travel vaccines or reimbursement of the membership fees 
of sport clubs. In addition to these services and benefits, which are accessible 
for the entire population, about three-quarters of the population has taken out 
voluntary additional health insurance, known as ‘hospitalisation insurance’ 
(‘hospitalisatieverzekering’ (Dutch) / ‘assurance hospitalisation’ (French)).30 
This hospitalisation insurance covers supplements and co-payments.31 There 
are three types of supplements, which are not covered by compulsory health 
insurance: fee supplements, room supplements and material supplements.
A fee supplement is an extra fee charged by healthcare providers on top 
of the official tariff set by the social security regime (‘ereloonsupplement’ 
(Dutch) / ‘supplément d’honoraires’ (French)).32 In a hospital setting, fee sup-
plements may only be charged to patients staying in a private, one-bed room. 
27   Supra note 14.
28   Public funding as share of total expenditure on health amounts to 77.6 per cent. Private 
expenditure represents 22.4 per cent of total health expenditure, see supra note 15.
29   In 2014, voluntary additional health insurance represented 4.4 per cent of total health 
expenditure. OECD Health Statistics 2016, see supra note 15.
30   Other types of additional health insurance, such as dental insurance or insurance for out-
patient costs, are taken out by less than 5 per cent of the Belgian population.
31   The term ‘statutory user charges’ can also be used instead of the term ‘co-payments’. 
Statutory user charges represent on average 38 per cent of total patient bill. Mutualité 
Chrétienne, ‘12e Baromètre MC de la facture hospitalière’, 21 November 2016, online at 
https://www.mc.be/actualite/communique-presse/2016/barometre_hospitalier_2016.jsp, 
accessed 24 January 2017.
32   In Anglo-American contexts, the terms ‘extra billing’ or ‘balance billing’ are used.
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In 2015, one out of every four patients stayed in a private room.33 In hospitals, 
fee supplements range between one and three times the official tariff, with sig-
nificant variations between the supplements in different regions.34 In a similar 
way to a fee supplement, a room supplement is charged by the hospital for 
the use of a private, one-bed room. When a stay in a private room is necessary 
because of medical reasons, room supplements may not be charged. A ‘ma-
terial’ supplement is requested for medical material which is not (yet) reim-
bursed by social security, e.g., non-reimbursable pharmaceuticals or a new hip 
implant.35 The costs linked to the use of a private hospital room — i.e., fee and 
room supplements — account for about half of total reimbursements made 
by hospitalisation insurance programmes.36 Whereas the total patient bill has 
been decreasing over the past ten years, this is not the case for fee supplements 
which have been steadily increasing.37
In order to curb the — often high — premium rate increases under hos-
pitalisation insurance contracts, a ‘medical index’ has been created by law. 
Premium rates can only be increased in line with the consumer prices index 
or the medical index.38 Only when an additional health insurance product is 
(expected to be) loss-making may an insurer request the supervisory authority, 
the National Bank of Belgium, for permission to increase premiums.39
33   In 2015, 23 per cent of all Belgian patients stayed in a private room for a regular hospitali-
sation (including at least one night), see supra note 31.
34   Most Flemish hospitals charge 100 per cent of the official tariff, most Walloon hospitals 
200 per cent, and most Brussels hospitals 300 per cent.
35   On average, material supplements account for about 7 per cent of total patient bill, see 
supra note 31.
36   The exact figure is 49 per cent (2015), see supra note 31.
37   After adjustment for inflation, supplementary fees have increased by 32 per cent between 
2004 and 2015, whereas total hospital bill for the patient has decreased by 5 per cent. In 
2015, supplementary fees represented 61 per cent of the average patient bill for a private 
hospital room, see supra note 31.
38   A law introduced on 17 June 2009 restricted increases in premium rates for existing con-
tracts to increases in the consumer price index or the medical index if and in so far as 
the evolution of the medical index exceeds that of the consumer price index (Article 204 
Insurance Law). The medical index reflects the evolution of the patient bill. Because the 
medical index did not include a provision to revalorise the ageing reserves, the medical 
index was annulled by the administrative court on 29 December 2011. By royal decree of 
16 March 2016, a new medical index has been created, including -on top of the claims 
evolution- a provision of maximum 2 per cent to cover the revalorisation of the ageing 
reserves.
39   Art. 204, §4 Insurance Law (‘Loi du 4 avril 2014 relative aux assurances, Moniteur belge, 
30 April 2014’).
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3.2.2  DKV Belgium SA v. Association belge des consommateurs Test-
Achats ASBL
In 2010, the Belgian consumer organisation Test-Achats ASBL, and the Belgian 
professional association of insurance companies Assuralia, lodged an action 
for annulment of the aforementioned law of 17 June 2009 on private addi-
tional health insurance contracts. In a judgment of 31 May 2011, the Belgian 
Constitutional Court upheld the legal restrictions on increases in premium 
rates.40 It stated that it was the goal of the legislator to protect consumers, 
particularly with a view to preventing them from being faced with sharp, unex-
pected increases in insurance premium rates.
In January 2010, DKV Belgium SA, a private insurance company offering 
additional health insurance products, increased insurance premium rates by 
7.84 per cent, well before the publication of the official medical index later 
that year. On 22 February 2010, Test-Achats brought an action for an injunc-
tion before the President of the Commercial Court in Brussels seeking to have 
DKV ordered to reverse its decision to increase premiums. By judgment of 
20 December 2010, the Court upheld Test-Achats’ complaint. DKV appealed 
against that judgment before the Brussels Court of Appeal. The Brussels Court 
of Appeal requested a preliminary ruling from the ECJ on the compatibility 
with EU law of Belgium’s legislation restricting premium rate increases of ad-
ditional health insurance contracts.41 The ECJ, in its judgment of 7 March 2013, 
held that ‘the non-life insurance directives do not preclude the Belgian legis-
lation restricting increases in premium rates’. The ECJ ruled that the Belgian 
rules do not constitute a breach of Articles 49 and 56 TFEU, ‘provided that 
there are no less restrictive measures which might be used to achieve, under 
the same conditions, the objective of protecting consumers against sharp, un-
expected increases in insurance premium rates, which is for the national court 
to ascertain’.42
Following the ECJ’s ruling, DKV argued before the national court that an 
ex post facto review of rate increases constituted a less restrictive alternative, 
compared to a prior review (as the non-life insurance Directives specifically 
prohibit retaining or introducing prior notification or approval of proposed 
increases in premium rates). However, on 22 February 2016, the Brussels Court 
of Appeal ruled that an ex post facto review does not represent a less restrictive 
alternative but only a different ‘modus operandi’.
40   Arrêt de la Cour constitutionnel 90/2011 du 31 mai 2011, Moniteur belge, 10 August 2011.
41   DKV Belgium SA v. Association belge des consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL, see supra 
note 1, para. 17.
42   Ibid., paras. 48 and 49.
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In its ruling, the ECJ stressed the fact that a system of premium rate increas-
es such as that at issue does not prohibit insurance undertakings from freely 
setting the basic premium and from taking account of the higher costs that 
the insurance coverage will entail for them when the insured party becomes 
older.43 Previously, the Belgian Constitutional Court had also defended the 
contested regulation with the argument that the insurer can freely determine 
all elements of the contract — including the premium — at the moment the 
contract is concluded.44
4  Uncertainty about the Application of EU Law
The apparent inconsistency in the ECJ’s recent case law has led to uncertainty 
as to the compatibility with EU law of restrictions on increases in premium 
rates. The question is to what extent free market rules effectively apply to ad-
ditional health insurance in the EU. An important element in the discussion is 
how the appropriateness of the restrictive measures taken by Member States 
can be assessed. In this section, we will discuss a set of criteria developed by 
the European Commission to test the proportionality of national regulation 
of private additional health insurance. We will also discuss the concept of ser-
vices of general economic interest (SGEIs). When an additional health insur-
ance scheme can be defined as an SGEI, the application of free market rules to 
that scheme can be restricted.
As discussed in section 3, while the ECJ held that Slovenian requirements 
of prior notification and approval of increases in premium rates of additional 
health insurance contracts were not compliant with the European non-life in-
surance Directives, the ECJ found the Belgian regime compliant.
In the Belgian case, the European Commission considered that the restric-
tions on increases in premium rates were contrary to the principle of freedom 
to set rates.45 In its ruling, the ECJ agreed that such a regulatory regime for 
premium rate increases in one Member State was liable to dissuade insurance 
undertakings established in other Member States from opening a branch in 
that first Member State or to offer their services there. The Court reasoned that 
those undertakings would have to determine their premium positioning and, 
therefore, their commercial strategy when they first set their premiums, with 
the risk that future premium rate increases would be insufficient to cover the 
43   Ibid., para. 45.
44   Supra note 40, para. B.13.7.3.
45   Cf. Commission v. Italy, see supra note 12, para. 101.
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costs with which they will be faced. However, the Court recalled that a restric-
tion on the freedom of establishment or the freedom to provide services may 
be justified where it serves overriding requirements relating to the public in-
terest, is suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which it pur-
sues and does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it.46 In past 
cases, the ECJ has accepted the objective of consumer protection, which was 
advanced by the Belgian government to defend the contested regulations, as 
an ‘overriding requirement relating to the public interest’.47
As for the suitability of the restrictive Belgian regulation for the attain-
ment of the objective it pursues, the European Commission expressed serious 
doubts.48 The Commission considered that it might prove difficult for the regu-
lator to reject proposed increases in premium rates for loss-making additional 
health insurance products. If this were the case, premium increases would not 
be prevented and the consumer would not be protected against sharp, unfore-
seen increases in premium rates. In other words, the Commission had serious 
doubts about the effectiveness of the regulation.
4.1  Proportionality of the Contested Regulation
In the DKV case, the European Commission proposed five criteria to assess the 
proportionality of national regulation relating to additional health insurance:49 
(1) the nature of the additional health insurance at issue (i.e., whether substitu-
tive, duplicative, supplementary or complementary), with national measures 
being more proportionate in case of substitutive health insurance; (2) the ex-
penditure by additional health insurance as a share of total national health 
expenditure, with national measures being more proportionate in case this 
share is increasing; (3) the objective of the public interest rationale invoked: 
granting access to additional health insurance irrespective of age and health 
status (and thus protecting the weakest in society) or protecting consumers 
who freely concluded their contract in a competitive market, with national 
measures being more proportionate in case the first objective is aimed at; 
(4) the existence of a competitive insurance market, which succeeds in creat-
ing a wider choice for the consumer and a decrease in premium rates, with 
national measures being more proportionate in case there is no really com-
petitive insurance market; (5) the existence of other, less restrictive measures.
46   Cf. ibid., para. 72.
47   Cf. Case 205/84, Commission v. Germany [1986] ECR 3755, paras. 32-33.
48   Commission Européenne, Observations écrites dans l’affaire C-577/11, Brussels, 
28 February 2012 ( JUR(2012)250478 CV/tm).
49   Ibid.
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What would be the consequences of applying these five criteria to the 
Slovenian and the Belgian cases?
(1) Nature of additional health insurance: Both in Belgium and Slovenia, ad-
ditional health insurance is not substitutive but complementary and 
supplementary. In Belgium, about half of total expenditure by additional 
health insurance is spent on providing access to a private hospital room. 
There are no studies available proving that the quality of care in a private 
room in a Belgian hospital is better than in a double or common room. In 
Slovenia, co-payments represent 85% of total reimbursement by addi-
tional health insurance. Therefore, as to this criterion, the Slovenian reg-
ulation may be considered more proportionate than the Belgian 
regulation.
(2) Expenditure by additional health insurance as a share of total expenditure 
on healthcare: While additional health insurance covers 14.8 per cent of 
total expenditure on healthcare in Slovenia, the figure reaches only 
4.4 per cent in Belgium (2014). In fact, the share of total health expendi-
ture covered by additional health insurance in Belgium has dropped from 
5.1 per cent in 2003 to 4.4 per cent in 2014. Over the same period, in 
Slovenia, there has been an increase from 13.9 per cent to 14.8 per cent.50 
So far as this criterion is concerned, the Slovenian regulation may be con-
sidered more proportionate than the Belgian regulation.
(3) Objective of public interest: Due to the existence of community rating in 
Slovenia, protecting consumers against sharp, unexpected increases 
in insurance premium rates equally serves the objective of granting ac-
cess to additional health insurance, irrespective of age and health status 
(by keeping premium rates affordable) and the objective of protecting 
consumers who freely conclude their contract in a competitive market. 
This is not the case for the Belgian market. In Belgium, insurers are com-
pletely free to set premium rates for new clients. New clients who suffer 
from a pre-existing condition may have to pay an extra premium. Once a 
contract is concluded, given their higher initial premium, high risk cli-
ents will be more impacted by subsequent premium increases (in abso-
lute terms). New clients are not protected by the restrictive regulation on 
increases in premium rates since this regulation is limited to existing 
contracts. Since the Slovenian regulation also affects access to additional 
health insurance, it appears to be more proportionate than the Belgian 
regulation.
50   Supra note 15.
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(4) Existence of a competitive insurance market: The Belgian health insurance 
market is more competitive than the Slovenian market. There is both a 
larger number of insurers and a bigger variety in premium levels in 
Belgium. In Slovenia, there are only 4 insurers, whose premium levels are 
close to each other,51 whereas in Belgium there are over 20 insurers.52 For 
these reasons, the Slovenian regulation may be more proportionate than 
the Belgian regulation as far as this criterion is concerned.
(5) Alternative measure possible: In its reasoned opinion on the Belgian case, 
the European Commission put forward a number of alternative mea-
sures: better information for consumers underwriting additional health 
insurance; a framework for contested contractual clauses; an obligation 
to offer a standard contract with limited premiums to vulnerable groups 
(cf. the ‘Basistarif ’ offered by private basic health insurance in Germany); 
a limitation of the technical part of the premium (i.e., pure premium and 
security loadings) in combination with a more flexible framework for the 
commercial part of the premium (i.e., administrative and commercial 
costs); a risk equalisation system.53 However, some of these supposedly 
less restrictive measures may well be more restrictive than linking pre-
mium increases to a price index (e.g., an obligation to offer a standard 
contract with limited premiums to vulnerable groups).
Given that additional health insurance expenditure as a share of total health-
care expenditure is much larger in Slovenia and the Slovenian additional 
health insurance market is less competitive than the Belgian market, it is re-
markable that the ECJ upheld the Belgian regulatory regime but found the 
Slovenian regime incompatible with EU law. Article 54 of the Third Non-Life 
Insurance Directive explicitly allows EU Member States to restrictively regu-
late private health insurance that serves as a partial or complete alternative to 
health cover provided by the statutory social security system. According to this 
criterion, since additional healthcare in Slovenia mainly covers co-payments 
(85%) and makes healthcare more accessible, the proportionality test rather 
points towards allowing restrictive regulation to be introduced in Slovenia.
51   Supra note 17 (source).
52   Five Belgian sickness funds offer voluntary additional health insurance products and so 
are more than 15 private insurance companies, online at http://www.assuralia.be/images/
docs/stats/NL/04_marktsamenstelling/04_11_top15-ziekte.htm, accessed 25 January 2017.
53   Supra note 48.
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Since the ECJ apparently accepted regulation of premium rate increases 
in Belgium but not in Slovenia, it is not clear whether this kind of regulation 
could be adopted by other EU Member States.
4.2  Can Additional Health Insurance Be Considered as a Service of  
General Economic Interest?
The qualification of an additional health insurance scheme as a service of gen-
eral economic interest (SGEI) can serve as a justification for national regula-
tion restricting the operation of the free market. SGEIs are commonly defined 
as economic activities that would not be generated by market forces alone 
or at least not in the form of an affordable service available to all on a non-
discriminatory basis.54 SGEIs are carried out in the public interest under con-
ditions defined by the State, which imposes a public service obligation on one 
or more providers.55 The concept ‘service of general economic interest’ (SGEI) 
is mentioned in Article 106(2) Treaty of the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU).
A key value of EU Member States’ healthcare systems, which applies to 
welfare services more generally, is universal access or coverage.56 To guaran-
tee universal coverage, the national government plays a vital role in regulating 
market-oriented systems. After all, the healthcare market is characterised by 
several instances of market failure, for instance information asymmetry and 
risk selection.57
When a service is determined to be an SGEI, Member States may enact mea-
sures which would otherwise be contrary to the rules of the Treaties, notably 
the competition rules. Member States retain a wide discretion to deﬁne SGEIs, 
54   J. Almunia, ‘Reform of the state aid rules for services of general economic interest (SGEI) 
and decisions on WestLB, Bank of Ireland and France Telecom’, Press conference, Brussels, 
20 December 2011. SPEECH/11/901.
55   European Commission, 2011, State aid: Commission adopts new package on state aid rules 
for services of general economic interest (SGEI) — frequently asked questions, online at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-929_en.htm accessed 25 January 2017.
56   U. Neergaard, ‘Services of general economic interest: the nature of the beast’, in: 
M. Krajewski, U. Neergaard and J.W. van de Gronden (eds.), The Changing Legal 
Framework for Services of General Interest in Europe — between Competition and Solidarity 
(The Hague: Asser Press, 2009) pp. 17-50.
57   S. Lavrijssen and S. de Vries, ‘Chapter 19, Netherlands’, in: Krajewski et al. (eds.), ibid., 
pp. 383-422.
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i.e., to use the concept of an SGEI as a tool to intervene in the market. This dis-
cretion is subject only to a test for manifest error of assessment.58
The closest attempt at clarifying the ‘manifest error of assessment’ test 
was made in BUPA where the European Court of Justice (ECJ) noted that the 
minimum criteria all SGEIs must fulﬁl are the presence of an act of the public 
authority entrusting the operators in question with an SGEI mission and the 
universal and compulsory nature of that mission.59
In BUPA, the ECJ deferred to the principal prerogative of the Member States 
to define their services of general economic interest. The case concerned an 
Irish law that established a risk equalisation scheme for private medical insur-
ance. Private insurers whose clients were below the average risk profile — like 
BUPA — would have to pay a fee, while insurance companies that provided 
insurance coverage for clients above the average risk profile were entitled to re-
ceive a payment. Claiming that the equalisation scheme constituted a breach 
of EU competition law, BUPA brought proceedings before the EU courts in the 
course of which the question arose whether private medical insurance was a 
public service that could fall under Article 106(2) TFEU.
In Ireland, a private medical insurance system operates alongside a tax 
based system. According to the facts of the case, approximately 50 per cent 
of the Irish population had taken out private insurance with one of the three 
private insurers. BUPA was one of the three insurance companies, but with-
drew from the market in 2007 after its appeal against the introduction of a risk 
equalisation scheme was rejected. The idea of setting up a risk equalisation 
scheme was that it should contribute to the attainment of the public inter-
est objectives served by private insurance, which are open enrolment (anyone 
under the age of 65 must be accepted), lifetime cover, community rating and 
minimum beneﬁts policy.60
One aspect of the case which is important to be discussed for the purposes 
of this article is that the ECJ classiﬁed private medical insurance as an SGEI, 
even though only about 50 per cent of the Irish population was covered by this 
additional insurance when the case was ﬁled.61 The ECJ addressed this fact, 
and the requirement of universality which it itself had speciﬁed as a mandatory 
58   G.S. Ølykke and P. Møllgaard, ‘What is a service of general economic interest?’, European 
Journal of Law and Economics 41(1) (2016) 205-241.
59   BUPA, see supra note 3, para. 172.
60   S. de Vries, ‘BUPA: a healthy case, in the light of a changing constitutional setting in 
Europe?’, in: J.W. van de Gronden, M. Krajewski, U. Neergaard and E. Szyszczak (eds.) 
Health Care and EU Law (The Hague: Asser Press, 2009) pp. 295-318.
61   BUPA, see supra note 3, para. 17.
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characteristic of an SGEI, by stating that: ‘The compulsory nature of the ser-
vice and, accordingly, the existence of an SGEI mission [is] established if the 
service-provider is obliged to contract, on consistent conditions, without being 
able to reject the other contracting party. That element makes it possible to 
distinguish a service forming part of an SGEI mission from any other service 
provided on the market and, accordingly, from any other activity carried out in 
complete freedom’.62 In other words, as long as the service is available to all of 
the population, the condition of universality is satisfied.63 The essential core 
of the definition of an SGEI thus lies in their potentially universal nature.
In the BUPA case, the ECJ concluded Irish additional health insurance to be 
an SGEI.
When the minimum criteria of an SGEI are fulfilled, a violation of the com-
petition rules can potentially be justified under Article 106(2) TFEU.
Coming back to the two cases at issue, the question arises whether Slovenian 
additional health insurance could be defined as an SGEI. Nikolič lists several 
arguments to defend this position.64 First, additional health insurance is an 
economic activity. Health insurance companies offer voluntary health insur-
ance coverage and take on the financial risk of engaging in this line of business. 
Second, the Slovenian legislator has stated that additional health insurance 
is a part of the social security system.65 Additional health insurance is an im-
portant and indispensable source of financing for the Slovenian healthcare 
system.66 The majority of the Slovenian population has taken out additional 
health insurance. Statutory user charges (co-payments) make up 85 per cent 
of total reimbursements by the Slovenian additional health insurance scheme. 
Third, the specific obligations, i.e., community rating, open enrolment and 
lifetime cover, which insurance companies offering additional health coverage 
have to respect, have been decreed by the legislator.67 Fourth, Slovenian ad-
ditional health insurance can be ascribed a universal and compulsory nature 
since insurance companies are obliged to contract without being able to reject 
the other contracting party (cf. open enrolment).
62   Ibid., para. 190.
63   Supra note 57.
64   B. Nikolič, ‘Slovenian complementary health insurance as a service of general economic 
interest’, International Public Administration Review 13(1) (2015) 49-67.
65   Art. 62 ZZVZZ.
66   Additional health insurance covers over half of private health expenditure with private 
health expenditure representing close to 30 per cent of total health expenditure.
67   Art. 62-62c ZZVZZ.
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Unlike the Belgian public interest argument — consumer protection — 
Slovenia’s public interest argument that Slovenian additional health insurance 
ought to be considered as a part of the social security system was rejected by 
the ECJ.
5  Free Market or Regulation?
A clear indication of how the organisation of additional health insurance with-
in the EU should evolve cannot be derived from the recent ECJ case law. Should 
competition be fostered or should more regulation be imposed? Starting from 
the Belgian and Slovenian ECJ cases on price regulation in the additional 
health insurance market, the discussion is broadened to the question of the 
extent to which free market rules effectively apply to additional health insur-
ance in the EU. The case law discussed above can serve as a starting point for 
an evaluation of where we stand today and what we should be heading for. 
What is the future role of additional health insurance within the framework of 
social health insurance systems in the EU? This article aims at stimulating the 
discussion on how additional health insurance ought to be organised in order 
to generate added value for the healthcare system without jeopardising equity 
concerns such as equal access to essential healthcare.
According to the European Commission, consumers’ interests are best pro-
tected by promoting free market principles: ‘competition encourages enter-
prise and efficiency, creates a wider choice for consumers and helps reduce 
prices and improve quality’.68 However, according to Thomson and Mossialos, 
there is no evidence to suggest that the expected benefits of competition have, 
as yet, materialised in the private health insurance sector.69 Private health in-
surance premiums have risen rather than fallen, often faster than inflation in 
the health sector as a whole, while insurers’ expansion across national borders 
has been limited to cross-border mergers and acquisitions, rather than genu-
inely new entrants to the market.70,71
68   European Commission, ‘Why is competition policy important for consumers?’, 
16 April 2012, accessed 26 January 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consumers/
why_en.html.
69   Supra note 11.
70   E. Mossialos and S. Thomson, Voluntary Health Insurance in the European Union 
(Copenhagen: World Health Organization, 2004), online at www.euro.who.int/__data/
assets/pdf_file/0006/98448/E84885.pdf, accessed 26 January 2017.
71   A. Sagan and S. Thomson, Voluntary Health Insurance in Europe, Role and Regulation 
(Brussels: European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2016), online at http://
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Equal access to healthcare is at the core of equity in health which implies 
that ideally everyone should have a fair opportunity to attain their full health 
potential and, more pragmatically, that no one should be disadvantaged from 
achieving this potential, if it can be avoided.72 The Constitution of the World 
Health Organisation sets out the following principle as ‘basic to the happi-
ness, harmonious relations and security of all peoples’: ‘The enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every 
human being without distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic or 
social condition’.73
Equity of access to healthcare services can be improved by defining essen-
tial healthcare services.74 Essential healthcare services should be made acces-
sible to everyone within the healthcare system. The Committee on Choices 
in Health Care, the so-called Dunning Committee, established in 1990 in the 
Netherlands, has developed a set of four principles, to be applied successively, 
in order to delineate essential from non-essential healthcare services: neces-
sity, effectiveness, efficiency, and individual responsibility. The principle of 
necessity is defined very broadly, basically meaning any treatment that is nec-
essary to maintain or restore health, or to relieve suffering.75 With regard to 
the principle of effectiveness, only interventions where there is evidence for 
an effect are covered. The services to be covered are further narrowed down by 
those that give value for money, by only funding efficient services. Finally, ser-
vices that are best dealt with by the individuals themselves are excluded (i.e., 
services that can easily be paid for by the individuals themselves).76
If additional health insurance really is so important that restrictive regula-
tion is needed, would it not be better to integrate additional health insurance 
within the social security system? The poor, the sick and the old who cannot 
afford voluntary additional health insurance are not protected by government 
designed consumer protection rules regarding the additional health insurance 
market. As a consequence, regulation of additional health insurance protects 
www.euro.who.int/en/about-us/partners/observatory/publications/studies/voluntary-
health-insurance-in-europe-role-and-regulation, accessed 26 January 2017.
72   M. Whitehead, ‘The concepts and principles of equity and health’, International Journal of 
Health Services 22(3) (1992) 429-445.
73   World Health Organisation, Basic Documents, Forty-fifth edition, Supplement, October 
2006, online at http://www.who.int/about/mission/en/, accessed 26 January 2017.
74   N. Söderlund, ‘Possible objectives and resulting entitlements of essential health care 
packages’, Health Policy 45(3) (1998) 195-208.
75   W.P.M.M. van de Ven, ‘Choices in health care: a contribution from The Netherlands’, 
British Medical Bulletin 51(4) (1995) 781-790.
76   L.M. Sabik and R.K. Lie, ‘Priority setting in health care: lessons from the experience of 
eight countries’, International Journal for Equity in Health 7(4) (2008) 1-13.
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only the well-off (or better-off) customers who can afford to buy additional 
health insurance. When additional health insurance covers essential health-
care, a more equitable result might be reached by integrating that care into the 
social security system rather than by developing restrictive regulation protect-
ing only the well-off part of the population who can afford additional health 
insurance.
In Slovenia, where additional health insurance primarily covers co-
payments, lower income groups might be better served by a decrease in 
co-payments or by direct subsidies rather than by introducing restrictive regu-
lation for voluntary additional health insurance.
In Belgium, additional health insurance mainly covers hospital care. About 
half of the money reimbursed by additional health insurance relates to the 
price of a stay in a private hospital room. Since quality of care in a private room 
is no better than in a double or common room, it might be difficult to uphold 
the view that special protection from government is needed to secure access to 
private hospital rooms.
New health technology is often reimbursed by additional health insur-
ance. From an equity point of view — if essential healthcare services are 
concerned — new health technology should be integrated in basic health 
insurance rather than protecting only those customers who can afford ad-
ditional cover.
Additional health insurance also provides financial protection from co-
payments. Traditionally, co-payments were introduced to reduce moral 
hazard.77 Co-payments are meant to prevent people from seeking medical care 
that may not be necessary. Apart from their traditional role, co-payments also 
allow the public sector to shift costs on to households.78 In countries where 
private additional health insurance covers co-payments, the scope of statutory 
coverage might erode over time and there are concerns about the fact that 
those who do not have additional health insurance may face financial and 
other barriers to accessing healthcare.79
77   M. Chalkley and R. Robinson, Theory and Evidence on Cost Sharing in Health Care: An 
Economic Perspective (London: Office of Health Economics, 1997), online at https://www 
.ohe.org/publications/theory-and-evidence-cost-sharing-health-care-economic-
perspective, accessed 26 January 2017.
78   S. Thomas, S. Thomson and T. Evetovits, ‘Making sense of complementary health insur-
ance’, final report, Slovenian Ministry of Public Health, 2015, online at http://www.mz.gov 
.si/fileadmin/mz.gov.si/pageuploads/Analiza/21012016/21012016Report_Making_sense_
of_CHI_-_Slovenia.pdf, accessed 26 January 2017.
79   S. Thomson and E. Mossialos, ‘Private health insurance in the European Union. Final re-
port prepared for the European Commission, Directorate General for Employment, Social 
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If there is insufficient public funding to reduce co-payments and to integrate 
(new) health technology within the mandatory basic health insurance system, 
basic health insurance could be extended with private funding. Low income 
groups, who cannot afford private funding, could be subsidised. The French 
government has chosen this option. In 2014, 7.4 per cent of those covered by 
additional health insurance benefited from a public programme providing free 
coverage to the poorest (‘complementary universal health coverage’, ‘couver-
ture maladie universelle complémentaire’ (CMU-C)).80 Individuals with an in-
come above the CMU-C ceiling can get a voucher to partially fund the premium 
for an additional health insurance contract (‘aide complémentaire santé’).
If all essential healthcare would be covered by an affordable basic health in-
surance scheme, there is no need to develop restrictive regulation for the volun-
tary additional health insurance market (covering non-essential healthcare).81 
With all essential care being covered by the social security system, customers 
taking out voluntary health insurance would no more need special govern-
ment protection than customers taking out home or car insurance.
In the Netherlands, the situation is clear-cut. According to the Dutch govern-
ment, all essential healthcare is covered by mandatory basic health insurance. 
Voluntary additional health insurance, providing top-up cover for alternative 
medicine, dental care and physiotherapy, is not regulated by the government.82
However, as long as essential healthcare is not always reimbursed by manda-
tory basic health insurance and as long as statutory user charges (co-payments) 
remain quite substantial or fee supplements — extra billing — continue to 
exist, additional health insurance schemes may well be important for secur-
ing access to healthcare. In two EU countries, France and Slovenia, private ad-
ditional health insurance accounts for more than ten per cent of total health 
Affairs and Equal Opportunities’, London School of Economics, 24 June 2009, online at 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=4216&langId=en accessed 26 January 2017.
80   C. Franc and A. Pierre, ‘Compulsory private complementary health insurance offered by 
employers in France: implications and current debate’, Health Policy 199(2) (2015) 111-116.
81   M.V. Pauly, ‘A plan for a responsible national health insurance’, Health Affairs 10(1) (1991) 
5-25.
82   See e.g., the letter of the Dutch government to the Parliament (Tweede Kamer) 
‘Beantwoording kamervragen over bericht dat vrouwen die zwanger zijn worden verwezen 
naar een andere zorgverzekeraar’, 19 January 2016, online at https://www.rijksoverheid 
.nl/ministeries/ministerie-van-volksgezondheid-welzijn-en-sport/documenten/
kamerstukken/2016/01/19/beantwoording-kamervragen-over-bericht-dat-vrouwen-die-
zwanger-zijn-of-willen-worden-worden-verwezen-naar-een-andere-zorgverzekeraar, 
accessed 26 January 2017,
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expenditure.83 Markets with substantial statutory user charges have the high-
est levels of additional health insurance coverage.84 Over half of the Irish pop-
ulation is covered by additional health insurance which covers statutory user 
charges and reimbursement of treatment in private hospital beds.85 In coun-
tries where additional health insurance plays an important role, a regulatory 
framework has been developed to facilitate access and to protect consumers.
Free market and regulation need not be opposites. Competition does not 
exclude regulation. On the contrary, regulation can improve competition and 
help create a level playing field. Regulation can empower consumers, e.g., 
by creating more transparency (for instance, by obliging the use of standard 
clauses or even the use of standard contracts in additional health insurance). 
In the second half of the 1990s, the Office for Fair Trade (OFT), at the time the 
United Kingdom’s regulatory agency for consumer protection,86 launched an 
investigation following concerns that customers lacked adequate information 
when buying private medical insurance. Regarding the ability of consumers to 
compare different products, the OFT reported: ‘different plans are presented 
in different ways, and it is difficult — if not impossible for those outside the 
industry — to compare them in terms of value for money’. The OFT also found 
problematic ‘the absence of information regarding past and likely future in-
creases in the premium’.87
A main obstacle for efficient and effective regulation is the information 
asymmetry between insurers and government. In Belgium, for instance, gov-
ernment regulation states that the medical index — used to adjust additional 
health insurance premiums to the evolution of healthcare costs —  cannot be 
negative, even when cost evolution is negative. Such regulation may not be in 
the best interest of consumers. Another issue is that a medical index of this 
sort could act as a disincentive for insurance companies to reduce costs, be-
cause they know that in the end cost increases will be covered by the medical 
83   France: 14.4 per cent (2014); Slovenia: 14.8 per cent (2015). Source: OECD Health Statistics 
2016, see supra note 15.
84   France: 95.5 per cent (2014); Slovenia: 72.8 per cent (2013). Source: OECD Health Statistics 
2016, see supra note 15.
85   D. McDaid, M. Wiley, A. Maresso and E. Mossialos, ‘Ireland: Health system review’, Health 
Systems in Transition 11(4) (2009) 1-268.
86   The OFT has since been replaced by the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA).
87   T. Foubister, S. Thomson, E. Mossialos and A. McGuire, Private Medical Insurance in the 
United Kingdom (Brussels: European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2006).
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index. In this way, the application of medical indices could even have an infla-
tionary effect.
When all essential care is included in the social security system and barriers 
to care (e.g., high co-payments) have been removed, the market for voluntary 
additional health insurance could be opened to private — for profit or not for 
profit — companies with real competition actively being fostered.

